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From iron curtain to velvet curtain? Peter Brook’s Hamlet and the origins of 
British-Soviet cultural relations during the Cold War. 
 
In November 1955, the innovative young director Peter Brook brought his new 
production of Hamlet to Moscow. This was an historic occasion: the first visit to the 
Soviet Union by a British theatre company. The Hamlet tour seemed to represent a 
thawing of east-west relations, a perfect illustration of the power of the performing 
arts to transcend the iron curtain. The metaphor of the iron curtain, like so much of the 
terminology of the cold war, derived from theatre: iron safety curtains were designed 
to prevent the spread of fires from stage to auditorium.
1
 Playing on this, the front 
cover of the Soviet satirical magazine, Krokodil, summed up the British visit with the 
words ‘We see no “iron curtain”, only a velvet one.’
2
 But to what extent did Hamlet 
succeed in overcoming the barriers between eastern and western Europe symbolised 
by the iron curtain? To understand the broader significance of this visit, and of cold 
war cultural diplomacy more generally, we need to ascertain what Hamlet meant for 
contemporaries on both sides of the political divide.  
 
The story of Hamlet forms part of a wider story about the evolution of east-west 
cultural diplomacy and the growing importance of state-sponsored performing arts 
tours during the cold war. Cultural diplomacy, defined here as government-directed 
international cultural relations activity aimed at advancing national interests,
3
 has 
attracted considerable attention in recent years as scholars increasingly acknowledge 
the importance of the cold war as a contest of ideologies and cultures, the ‘pursuit of 
war by other means.’
4
 We now know more about the Soviet Union’s so-called 
‘cultural offensive’ in the west, with its heavy emphasis on dance and music tours 
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designed to showcase the supremacy of the Soviet system.
5
 We are also learning more 
about the corresponding western ‘counter-offensive’ in the Soviet bloc, much of it 
targeted at the USSR itself. Not surprisingly, given the tendency of the two camps 
consciously or unconsciously to mirror each other’s practices, the west also attached 
considerable importance to tours of artists enlisted for the task of performing the 
nation/system.
6
  
 
As the most highly visible manifestation of western cultural diplomacy in the USSR, 
performing arts tours have not been ignored by scholars. However, like so much of 
the literature on the cold war, studies of the cultural diplomacy of ‘the west’ in the 
USSR generally concentrate on US initiatives, such as the well-known tours of ‘jazz 
ambassadors’ in the 1960s.
7
 Much less clearly understood are the distinctive 
contributions of western European states, particularly during the 1950s, the formative 
period of east-west cultural relations. Barghoorn’s 1960 study, while still a mine of 
information, is in many ways dated, a product of the cold war climate in which it was 
produced.
8
 Caute’s excellent survey offers some tantalising glimpses of European 
performing arts tours of the USSR, including the Hamlet tour.  Yet Caute’s primary 
focus remains superpower competition, the struggle between ‘pax americana’ and 
‘pax sovietica’ as he puts it.
9
 We still know too little about western European theatre, 
dance and music tours in this period. What were their objectives, what forms did they 
assume and what was the nature of their influence?  How were they shaped by both 
national and regional political imperatives and traditions of cultural diplomacy? How 
important was it that participants on both sides of the curtain shared a common 
‘European’ culture?  This study goes a small way to addressing such questions by 
presenting a close analysis of one of western Europe’s earliest and arguably most 
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important exercises in cultural diplomacy in the post-Stalin USSR, Britain’s Hamlet 
tour. 
  
It appears that, after some initial hesitation, Britain came to accept that it must play a 
leading role on the cultural front. Although not as quick off the blocks as France, 
which had a long tradition of cultural diplomacy and sponsored a landmark visit of the 
Comedie Francaise to the Soviet Union in 1954, Britain was initially more 
enthusiastic than its closest ally, the United States.
10
 The Khrushchev-Bulganin visit 
to Britain in 1956 is often heralded as a breakthrough in the development of cultural 
links between the two states, however momentum was clearly building up long before 
this.
11
 In 1955, the Conservative government took the controversial step of 
establishing a new body charged with responsibility for developing cultural ties with 
the USSR: the Soviet Relations Committee of the British Council (SRC). This 
committee merits closer attention since it played a critical role in the promotion of 
Soviet-British cultural relations in the 1950s: Hamlet was just one of the many 
performing arts tours and other visits it sponsored until it was disbanded in 1959.
12
  
 
What prompted Britain to take such a leading role? As J. M. Lee points out, the 
government’s attitude towards cultural diplomacy was generally lukewarm in this 
period.
13
 However, cultural diplomacy assumed a higher priority when it could be 
harnessed to the cause of anti-communism on both a domestic and an international 
level. One of the SRC’s central aims was to counteract the influence of the pro-Soviet 
so-called ‘front’ organisations in Britain which had monopolised cultural relations 
with the USSR. Its other main goal was to stimulate political change in the Soviet 
Union: it was thought that by exposing the educated elite to the culture of western 
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Europe, Britain could help to bring about the peaceful evolution of the Soviet system. 
For a European nation facing the decline of its hard power, this ‘softer’ approach to 
the east-west conflict seemed more viable than the confrontational and ambitious 
strategies still favoured by some in the US. Unlike the Foreign Office, the State 
Department remained reluctant to commit wholeheartedly to cultural relations with 
the USSR at this stage. To give just one example: Everyman Opera Company had to 
overcome great resistance before it was permitted to take Porgy and Bess to the USSR 
in December 1955, and the State Department refused to pay for the visit, despite 
having funded other legs of the company’s world tour.
14
 The contrast with the SRC’s 
active sponsorship of Hamlet could hardly be clearer. 
 
Why was a tour of Hamlet seen as an ideal way to launch the SRC’s operations in the 
Soviet Union? As Caute points out, like a sporting contest, the cold war ‘Cultural 
Olympics’ required an agreed field of play.
15
 With his transnational appeal and 
malleability, Shakespeare frequently served as the terrain for cold war cultural 
battles.
16
 Shakespeare provided a particularly valuable focus for Britain’s contest with 
the USSR since he was regarded as both a British national icon and a key symbol of 
European ‘civilisation’. Deploying Shakespeare allowed Britain to assert its European 
identity and ‘culturedness’ at a time when the Soviet Union was highlighting the 
common cultural values which distinguished Europeans from the allegedly uncultured 
‘brash Americans.’
17
 It also offered Britain an opportunity to impress Soviet 
audiences with the superiority of its Shakespearean tradition and refute claims that 
only under socialism could the bard truly thrive. Hamlet was a particularly propitious 
choice, since it was perhaps the most ‘universal’ of Shakespeare’s plays, and one 
which was hugely popular in the USSR during the cultural ‘Thaw’ following Stalin’s 
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death. British officials understood that Peter Brook’s Hamlet would be compared 
directly with Soviet productions of Hamlet, and they expected it to win this 
competition.  
 
Thus, in the eyes of the British officials involved in the tour, Hamlet was primarily an 
adjunct to foreign policy, a propaganda weapon designed to showcase the ascendancy 
of Britain and the west. Likewise, some representatives of the Soviet state regarded 
the visit through the limited framework of political warfare, seeing it as an 
opportunity to bolster the status of the USSR in various ways.  But how was it 
understood by the non-state ‘actors’ involved? Akira Iriye has argued that on one 
level the cold war intensified antagonism between nations, while on another it helped 
to stimulate the growth of more cooperative, internationalist sentiment.
18
 The Hamlet 
tour certainly seems to exemplify these apparently contradictory tendencies. Officials 
may have regarded the tour as an extension of warfare, but sources generated by 
individuals rather than government departments suggest that British visitors and 
members of the Soviet public interpreted the tour in a more genuinely internationalist 
spirit. What was, for most, their first direct encounter with the ‘other’ encouraged 
them to question the stereotypes of the cold war, to realise that they had much in 
common with one another, and to seek to learn from and cooperate with their 
counterparts on the other side of Europe.  The Hamlet tour is thus an intriguing 
example of the often ambiguous nature of cold war cultural diplomacy, and of how 
Shakespeare had the power at once to undermine and perpetuate divisions between 
eastern and western Europe.  
 
Cultural relations as a ‘cold war operation’ 
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From the British government perspective, Hamlet was part of a wider political 
operation. It was the first major mission of the Soviet Relations Committee, a body 
established as a somewhat belated response to the cultural offensive launched by the 
Soviet Union after Stalin’s death. Following several years of relative isolationism, the 
new reform-minded Soviet leadership seemed eager to promote cultural relations with 
the west, especially western Europe, to send their performing artists abroad and 
receive western artists under the banner of international peace and understanding. 
Behind this public rhetoric lay a number of impulses, not least a desire to demonstrate 
the superiority of Soviet socialism by exploiting the prestige of Soviet high culture at 
a time when American culture was perceived by many European intellectuals to be 
materialistic and shallow.
19
 
 
Initially the British government was unsure how to respond to its adversary’s new 
onslaught. Foreign Office officials were reluctant to abet what they regarded as just 
another variety of communist propaganda designed to encourage pro-Soviet sentiment 
in Britain. For example, in autumn 1953, one of the earliest proposals for developing 
British-Soviet cultural relations - that the Bolshoi Ballet might be invited to Britain – 
sparked concern in the Foreign Office that such a visit would be exploited not only by 
the Communist Party but also by pro-Soviet organisations such as the British-Soviet 
Friendship Society (BSFS) and the Society for Cultural Relations with the USSR 
(SCR).
20
 The latter societies, described somewhat dismissively by the government as 
‘fronts’, were a particular source of concern, despite their relatively small size: in 
1954, the BSFS and SCR had memberships of about 12,000 and 2,000 respectively. 
The smaller and less overtly political SCR was regarded in some ways as the most 
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threatening since it had ‘a more respectable façade’ than the BSFS, which had been 
proscribed by the Labour Party, and enjoyed the support of some influential non-
communist intellectuals and cultural figures.
21
 
 
However, it is clear that by boycotting cultural relations with the USSR, the British 
government simply played into the hands of the ‘fronts’, since the Soviet Union chose 
to rely on the latter as intermediaries when sending its performing artists to Britain. 
Increasing numbers of high-profile Soviet performers started to descend on Britain for 
the annual ‘British-Soviet Friendship Months’ held under the auspices of the BSFS 
and SCR.
22
 In 1953, a delegation of 20 arrived (compared with only 7 in 1952), 
including the violinist Igor Oistrakh and the director of the Moscow State Puppet 
Theatre, Sergei Obraztsev. The group toured the country, performing in front of 
substantial audiences at a variety of prestigious venues such as the Royal Albert Hall. 
The performances received attention in the press and, for the first time, from the 
BBC.
23
  The 1954 ‘Month’ was even more ambitious: at the direct instigation of the 
Soviet Presidium, the size of the delegation was increased to 27 and prominent figures 
such as David Oistrakh and several Bolshoi Theatre artists were included.
24
 Outside 
the framework of the Friendship Months, the BSFS and SCR also facilitated tours 
arranged by commercial impresarios: in 1954, with their support, the impresario Peter 
Daubney organised successful visits of the Berezka folk dance ensemble and the 
Moscow State Puppet Theatre.
25
  
 
The Foreign Office was at once impressed and alarmed by this new-style Soviet show 
of strength.  Following the 1953 Friendship Month, the Northern Department’s Harry 
Hohler reported that Soviet artists had enjoyed ‘a well deserved success.’ Noting the 
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absence of overt Soviet propaganda at the events, he concluded that ‘there must be 
many intelligent people who have been persuaded, as likely as not unconsciously, to 
lend a more sympathetic ear to Soviet claims and pretensions.’
26
 Over the course of 
1954, anxiety mounted about the wisdom of allowing the ‘fronts’ to act as mediators 
of Soviet culture in Britain (and of British culture in the USSR.)
27
 In theory, the 
government could have denied visas to the Soviet visitors, but brandishing the visa 
weapon was regarded as politically inflammatory. Instead, government officials were 
instructed to decline Soviet Embassy invitations to all Friendship Month events.
28
 By 
this stage, many in the Foreign Office had reached the conclusion that the only 
effective way to marginalise the Soviet ‘stooges’ would be for the government to 
channel British-Soviet cultural relations through a more politically suitable agency. 
They based this idea on the assumption that ‘[T]he Soviets are always very ready to 
discard local Communists when they become more nuisance than use.’
29
  
 
As it happened, the ‘fronts’ were indeed starting to be regarded as a nuisance in 
Moscow. Concerns were developing within the Central Committee’s Department of 
Culture about their ability to cope with the increasing volume of Soviet visitors to 
Britain. Ironically, whereas British officials had been struck by the success of the 
1954 Friendship Month, the Soviet authorities were unhappy with the BSFS’s 
management of the proceedings. According to Soviet reports, the concert halls were 
half-empty and apart from David Oistrakh’s very successful event, no other solo 
concerts had been arranged. The whole episode convinced Soviet officials that the 
USSR should consider establishing direct contacts with impresarios and other relevant 
agencies, rather than simply relying on the friendship societies. Such arrangements 
would have obvious financial advantages, but more importantly, they would allow 
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Soviet artists to get a proper showing: ‘the chance … to compete on a level playing 
field with the best musicians and singers from capitalist countries, the chance to 
demonstrate more fully and convincingly the advantages of Soviet art.’
30
 
 
So, it transpired that both Britain and USSR shared a common interest in bypassing 
the friendship societies. But squeezing out the ‘fronts’ was not the sole argument in 
favour of the government embracing cultural relations. By the mid-1950s, it was 
becoming increasingly clear that it was not in Britain’s interest to be perceived to be 
erecting ‘its own, rather ineffective, Iron Curtain’ by boycotting cultural links with the 
Soviet Union.
31
 There was also a growing sense that a policy of ‘cultural infiltration’, 
as Hixson calls it, was likely to have a desirable political effect on the USSR. 
Influenced, no doubt, by modernisation theory, British officials argued that exposing 
Soviet citizens to ‘western’ culture and ideas, from which they had been cut off under 
Stalin, could stimulate a process of evolutionary change within the USSR, which 
might, over the longer term, help to bring about the end of the cold war.
32
 The 
educated Soviet elite was assumed to be the natural ‘target’ for this variety of political 
warfare. British overseas propaganda, unlike the of the US, had always been oriented 
exclusively towards elites, the so-called ‘opinion-formers’, and Foreign Office 
officials spoke explicitly about the ‘new Soviet bourgeoisie’, the ‘new class’ and the 
‘intelligentsia’ as the ‘primary “target” in terms of political warfare’ over the long 
term.
33
 Educated professionals and white-collar workers, commonly referred to in the 
USSR as the ‘intelligentsia’, made up an increasing proportion of the USSR’s 
population by the mid-1950s.
34
 It was suggested that this element was more likely to 
be dissatisfied with the status quo and in a position to exert some political pressure on 
the leadership. This ‘class’ was also thought to be especially susceptible to an 
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injection of European high culture: officials spoke about exploiting ‘the nostalgia 
which educated Russians undoubtedly feel for the culture of Western Europe from 
which Stalinism has practically excluded them’, observing that the Comedie 
Francaise’s path-breaking visit had given the ‘intelligentsia’ a chance to express 
‘these pent-up feelings.’
35
   
 
From a British perspective, this gradualist version of political warfare seemed a better 
option than the more militant strategies hitherto favoured by the US, which continued 
to harbour hopes of ‘liberating’ the peoples behind the iron curtain and to rely on 
methods such as broadcasting stridently anti-communist messages on Radio Free 
Europe. While some members of the Eisenhower administration were starting to 
recognise the advantages of a ‘cultural infiltration’ approach, at this stage there was 
still considerable resistance in the US to the idea of any form of cooperation with the 
Soviet Union.
36
 It is worth emphasising here that the Churchill and Eden governments 
had always been more interested in finding diplomatic solutions to the east-west 
conflict in the early 1950s.
37
 Britain was understandably averse to methods likely to 
provoke conflict on the continent of Europe and keen to exploit the opportunities 
presented by geographical proximity and a shared European culture and history. It 
was also becoming ever more apparent that Britain would have to rely on soft power, 
including cultural diplomacy, if it was to maintain its influence on the world stage at a 
time of declining military and economic power.
38
  
 
Although there were strong arguments in favour of Britain engaging in cultural 
relations with the Soviet Union, there were some equally strong objections to the 
notion of cooperating with what was perceived by many to be a hostile, ‘totalitarian’ 
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regime. Fears were expressed that such a policy would serve to legitimise the Soviet 
Union, to make it appear ‘a normal and reasonable country’. There was also anxiety 
about the political risks of exposing Britain to yet more Soviet influences. It was 
suggested that the policy might have a disarming effect and that Britons might come 
to believe that ‘because the Russians are displaying the arts of peace, they are 
neglecting the arts of war.’ The international repercussions could also be 
considerable, with the possible American reaction to British-Soviet ‘cultural flirtation’ 
a particular cause for concern. Even if these risks were perceived to be outweighed by 
the potential benefits, there was also the question of cost: could the expense really be 
justified at a time when the budgets of the Information Services were under 
considerable strain?
39
 
 
In the end, after some prevarication, the case for British involvement prevailed, in part 
thanks to a campaign led by the Labour MP, Christopher Mayhew,  a fervent 
proponent of measures to counter Soviet propaganda.
40
 In early 1955, the government 
agreed to set up a Soviet Relations Committee under the auspices of the British 
Council. Chaired by Mayhew, it included a Conservative MP, the Chair of the TUC, a 
Foreign Office representative and the Director General of the British Council.
41
 This 
association between the British Council and the SRC always had the potential to be 
problematic. Whereas the Council was supposed to refrain from overtly ‘political’ 
activity and operate at arm’s length from government, the SRC was an undisguisedly 
political body which was expected to work closely with the Foreign Office.
42
 As the 
Foreign Office’s Robin Turton explained to the Treasury, this was not a normal 
British Council programme, so could not be financed out of existing Council funds; 
rather it was ‘a cold war operation designed to frustrate the activities of the Dean of 
Page 11 of 48
Cambridge University Press
Contemporary European History
For Peer Review
12 
 
Canterbury and suchlike persons’ (a reference to the chairman of the BSFS): the 
British Council was simply serving as an umbrella.
43
 At the first meeting of the SRC 
in April 1955, it was initially suggested that the committee’s objective should be ‘to 
spread a knowledge of Britain inside the Soviet Union primarily by encouraging visits 
to this country under proper auspices and discouraging visits under communist 
auspices.’ Presumably this overtly anti-communist slant and the emphasis on one-way 
communication rather than dialogue were regarded as too contentious for activity 
nominally under British Council auspices, for it was decided that the ‘formal 
definition’ of the SRC’s objectives should be less obviously political: ‘to encourage 
on a reciprocal basis mutual understanding between the two countries, primarily by 
sponsoring under approved auspices visits in both directions of groups concerned with 
a variety of professional and similar subjects.’
44
 Rhetoric about ‘mutual 
understanding’ notwithstanding, it is clear that from the very start, the SRC was 
viewed primarily as a weapon in the battle against communism both at home and 
abroad. Hamlet was an essential first step in this ‘cold war operation’.  
 
The importance of playing Shakespeare: theatre and national prestige 
Why was Hamlet chosen as the SRC’s first major mission in the USSR? The 
committee had identified three priorities: first, to bring ‘influential Russians’ t Britain; 
secondly, to send ‘sensible representatives of Britain’ to the Soviet Union, thirdly, ‘to 
promote, on a reciprocal basis, artistic and cultural manifestations’.
45
 ‘Manifestations’ 
- performing arts tours, art exhibitions and so on - were relegated to third place not 
only because of the expense involved, but also because of the perception that this was 
the area in which the Soviet Union had the most to gain; as Mayhew put it, 
manifestations ‘give the maximum impression of free contact, and create the 
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maximum goodwill for the Soviet Union, while necessitating the minimum real 
breach in the Iron Curtain.’
46
  
 
Although manifestations were not the top priority, it was agreed that if the SRC was 
to succeed it must kick off with a highly visible cultural event. From the outset, 
Foreign Office officials exerted a remarkable degree of influence over the selection of 
this manifestation. Their prime consideration was that it should be of the highest 
quality and guaranteed to enhance British prestige in the USSR. They were 
particularly concerned that there should be no repeat of a recent blow to prestige: 
Dinamo’s 5-0 victory over Arsenal in a ‘friendly’ football match in Moscow. Sport, 
like culture, was an important cold war battleground (and one where it was more than 
usually obvious who the winners and losers were.) Arsenal was the first British club 
to play in the USSR and the match coincided with a British Parliamentary Delegation 
visit to Moscow. The humiliating defeat was thus the source of much angst, with 
officials complaining that the match had done ‘nothing to enhance British prestige in 
the field of sport or to improve Anglo-Soviet relations … its main effect was to 
minister to Russian self-satisfaction and to their conviction of their complete 
superiority over us even in fields in which we are traditionally expert.’
47
 Ambassador 
Sir William Hayter wrote to the foreign secretary Sir Anthony Eden stressing that 
lessons must learned: whatever cultural manifestation Britain chose to send to the 
Soviet Union should be of the ‘highest quality’ and matters of this importance should 
not be left to ‘politically irresponsible’ bodies such as the Football Association.
48
 
 
It appeared to go without saying that a manifestation of British high culture was 
required for the latest round of British-Soviet competition. Like a football match, a 
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cultural contest needed a common terrain,
49
 and it was assumed that Britain would 
respond to the predominantly high cultural offensive of the USSR with an offering 
designed to underline its own commitment to high culture and guaranteed to appeal to 
its political target, the educated Soviet elite, with its strong interest in European high 
culture. A tour by a suitable British theatre company seemed the most logical choice. 
Theatre occupied a privileged position in Soviet cultural life and the Soviet authorities 
had been signalling their interest in a theatre visit since 1953.
50
 More importantly, 
literature and theatre were widely recognised as Britain’s greatest cultural strengths. 
As Lord Silkin subsequently acknowledged during a parliamentary debate on the arts, 
Britain had not produced any truly great composers or painters but ‘Shakespeare and 
Dickens are as familiar in the Soviet Union and in other countries behind the Iron 
Curtain as they are in this country and in Germany.’ He described this as ‘a wonderful 
cultural inheritance which has been handed to us, …a great bond between 
nations…’
51
 Literature and theatre had traditionally played a prominent role in 
Britain’s cultural relations with other countries: Jessica Gienow-Hecht observes that 
whereas Germany tended to stress music and France art when cultivating ties with 
America before the First World War, Britain relied on its literature and theatre.
52
 In 
the aftermath of the Second World War, British theatre diplomacy assumed particular 
importance : an Old Vic tour of war-ravaged Europe in the summer of 1945 was 
followed by a succession of international theatre tours, including a remarkable British 
Council-sponsored seven-month tour of Australasia by the Old Vic in 1948.
53
  
In the context of cold war cultural competition, theatre was one sphere in which 
Britain had some chance of demonstrating its superiority vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. 
At this stage, it was considered too risky to try to compete in any of the obvious 
Soviet areas of strengths, such as ballet. For example, the SRC expressed concerns 
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that Sadler’s Wells ‘might not be of a sufficiently high technical standard to be 
favourably received in the Soviet Union.’
54
 Similarly, in 1956 the Parliamentary 
Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs advised against Khrushchev and Bulganin 
attending an opera or ballet at Covent Garden during their visit to Britain ‘because we 
cannot match the Russian performances’. It was suggested that the Soviet leaders 
could see a Shakespearean production at the Old Vic instead.
55
  
 
Shakespeare, one of Britain’s most valuable cultural assets, was the obvious candidate 
for the SRC to take to the USSR.  According to what Dennis Kennedy calls the ‘myth 
of cultural ownership’, Shakespeare is often deemed to ‘belong’ to England by virtue 
of having been born in Stratford and writing in English.
56
  He has been defined as ‘our 
Shakespeare’, ‘the National Poet’, or, as Silkin put it in his aforementioned speech ‘a 
wonderful cultural inheritance which has been handed to us…’ Yet, as Silkin’s speech 
also implied, Shakespeare has been valuable for Britain precisely because of his status 
as a transnational as well as a national icon, a figure whose appeal transcends 
geographical borders. This appeal has meant that Shakespeare has often served to 
create common bonds across cultures, for example in his role as a ‘European’ writer.
57
 
However, he has also been the focus of national and ideological conflict. During 
periods of international tension, rival nations have sometimes vied over ownership of 
Shakespeare. Britain has not been alone in claiming Shakespeare as its ‘National 
Poet’: in nineteenth-century Germany, he was adopted by romantic nationalists as 
‘unser Shakespeare’, and at times of heightened British-German rivalry, arguments 
flared over who actually owned him. For example, in the midst of the First World 
War, the German dramatist Hauptmann proclaimed: ‘There is no people, not even the 
English, which can with more justification claim Shakespeare as their own as the 
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German people … And even if it was in England that he was born and lies buried, 
Germany is the country where he truly lives.’.
58
  
 
The nineteenth century also witnessed growing Russian infatuation with the bard, 
particularly amongst writers. Turgenev was notably enamoured: in a speech to mark 
the 300
th
 anniversary of Shakespeare’s birthday, he too claimed ownership of 
Shakespeare, declaring that he had become ‘our flesh and blood.’
59
 Shakespeare 
continued to be revered in the Soviet Union, where the Communist Party’s civilising 
mission included the selective but energetic promotion of European classical realist 
culture to the masses in the name of what Yurchak calls ‘good internationalism’.
60
 
While the ambivalence of the writer’s work meant that he ‘could, and usually did, 
simultaneously serve and subvert the official ideology’, it was the state’s harnessing 
of Shakespeare to the cause of Soviet socialism that was perhaps more immediately 
striking than his appropriation for subversive purposes.
61
 This was especially true of 
the Stalin years, when an elaborate official cult of Shakespeare developed based on 
his role as the ‘founding father’ of socialist realism. Shakespeare was ‘Sovietised’ to 
the extent that in 1939 the director Sergei Radlov could assert: ‘In 25 years, in the 
anniversary year of Shakespeare’s 400
th
 birthday, bewildered western scholars will 
have to certify that Shakespeare has changed his place of birth, and [instead] of the 
countries which speak his native English tongue, he now prefers the variety of dialects 
and languages of the great family of nations which populate our Union.’
 62
 Soviet 
Shakespeare veneration continued after Stalin’s death, along with official claims that 
only in the USSR was the ‘people’s writer’ truly understood and appreciated.  
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This Soviet cult of Shakespeare presented Britain with certain opportunities. The 
predominantly non-verbal, less overtly ideological, arts of music and dance are the 
mainstay of much cultural diplomacy. Theatre does not always translate between 
cultures so readily, but Shakespeare’s popularity in the Soviet Union meant that his 
plays had the potential to serve as a lingua franca. Shakespeare’s Europeanness was 
also an asset. By deploying Shakespeare, Britain could deliver an important message 
about the two countries’ common European identity, which was useful at a time when 
the USSR was, for its own reasons, choosing to emphasise the cultural unity of 
Europe and recalling the connections between Russian/Soviet artists and their 
counterparts in the rest of the continent.
63
 It would also allow Britain to distinguish 
itself subtly from the US with which it had often been associated in Soviet 
propaganda about ‘Anglo-American warmongers’. Finally, a top-quality British 
production might challenge Soviet assumptions about the inherent superiority of 
‘their’ Shakespeare: as Hayter commented when a tour was first mooted, ‘Soviet 
propaganda suggests that capitalist England has commercialised Shakespeare and 
discarded its poetic birthright and it would do a certain amount of good if even a small 
selected company of students could see that British theatrical and Shakespearean 
tradition are still high.’ Rejecting a suggestion that Soviet actors could be used for the 
crowd scenes, he argued that ‘Russian productions of Shakespeare are stereotyped and 
half the point of bringing a British company over to Russia would be lost if we could 
not present the best of our production as a whole.’
64
 The Northern Department’s 
George Jellicoe also supported sending a Shakespearean company, partly because of 
Soviet familiarity with the plays, but also because ‘We can act Shakespeare better 
than the Russians can.’
65
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The political advantages of presenting Shakespeare were thus abundantly clear. Only 
one other serious suggestion was floated – that Britain should send a production of 
Ibsen’s Hedda Gabler. Although this production was highly-rated, the playwright’s 
nationality created problems. Hayter expressed strong reservations: ‘it seems to me 
slightly absurd that the first English company to come here should present a foreign 
play in translation; it creates the impression that there are no English plays.’ The 
Deputy Under-Secretary Sir Harold Caccia was adamant that the government would 
not pay for a play by a Norwegian author. Although there was some discussion about 
whether such a ‘nationalist line’ was justified, the project was in any case killed by 
the Cultural Counsellor at the Soviet Embassy who declared Hedda Gabler ‘too 
gloomy’ and expressed a strong preference for a British play.
66
 
 
For the purposes of prestige, it was vital that Shakespeare be performed by a company 
of the highest quality - as Hayter put it, ‘no second team would do’. From the Foreign 
Office’s typically conservative perspective, the two safest options were the 
Shakespeare Memorial Theatre (SMT) and the Old Vic, although concerns were 
expressed about the quality of both these.
67
 In an explicit comparison with the recent 
football fiasco, the British Council’s Kenneth Johnstone commented that sending the 
Old Vic would be like ‘sending Arsenal to represent British football’. Johnstone’s 
preference was for the SMT, but others felt that its standards had fallen recently 
because of its policy of ‘favouring the young and unknown’ and ‘the regrettable 
experiments of Anthony Quayle.’ However, the fact that Laurence Olivier and Vivien 
Leigh were due to return to the company in 1955 was cause for optimism. The couple 
were well-known in the USSR thanks to their film roles, the Soviet authorities had 
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explicitly mentioned that they wanted them to come, and Olivier was apparently eager 
to have the distinction of being the first major British actor to perform in the USSR.
68
  
In the end, however, it proved impossible to secure the services of either company 
within the necessary timeframe.
69
 By August 1955, as Soviet-British relations entered 
their post-Geneva summit ‘honeymoon’ phase, the pressure on Britain to offer a 
demonstration of its commitment grew increasingly urgent.
70
 At the last minute, a 
new option presented itself in the form of Tennent Productions’ Hamlet, directed by 
Peter Brook and starring Paul Scofield. Although not as obviously prestigious as an 
Old Vic or SMT production, there were strong indications that it would of suitable 
quality to take to Moscow.
71
 H. M. Tennent Ltd had dominated the West End for 
years under the guidance of the influential Binkie Beaumont, who could count Sir 
Anthony Eden amongst his personal friends.
72
 Beaumont was in a position to attract 
the finest actors and directors, including the young Peter Brook, who by the mid-
1950s had already established his reputation as an innovative Shakespearean 
director.
73
 Brook had a long history of successful collaboration with Paul Scofield, 
regarded as one of the outstanding actors of his generation.
74
 Expectations for the 
Brook-Scofield Hamlet were thus justifiably high.  
The choice of Hamlet proved to be particularly serendipitous. Of all Shakespeare’s 
plays, it undoubtedly enjoys the greatest international renown, in part because of its 
capacity to address such broad socio-political and philosophical questions.
75
 As the 
Polish critic Jan Kott famously put it, ‘Hamlet is like a sponge. Unless produced in 
stylized or antiquarian fashion, it immediately absorbs all the problems of our time.’
76
 
Hamlet had always provided a rich medium for nations such as Germany and Russia 
to engage in self-analysis. In Kott’s communist Poland, Hamlet’s status as an 
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officially-sanctioned Shakespearean ‘classic’ meant that it could be used to explore 
the experience of dictatorship without unduly provoking the authorities. It served a 
similar Aesopian function of veiled critique in other Soviet bloc countries, including 
the USSR itself.
77
 
In the USSR, Hamlet experienced a predictably chequered fate. Prior to the 
revolution, the most significant production had been the Moscow Art Theatre’s 
modernist 1911-12 version co-directed by Stanislavsky and Britain’s Gordon Craig (it 
was fortunate that this earlier example of Anglo-Russian Hamlet collaboration was 
still warmly remembered in the Soviet Union of the 1950s.) The interwar period saw 
two major Soviet productions - Mikhail Chekhov’s of 1924-5 and Nikolai Akimov’s 
of 1932 - both of which attracted criticism from the authorities. Stalin reportedly 
loathed Hamlet, with its vacillating intellectual protagonist, and no important 
productions of the play appear to have been staged during or after the war.
78
 Only 
after Stalin’s death did Hamlet return to the Soviet stage with a vengeance: ‘Hamlet 
fever’ broke out almost immediately as the play came to be identified with the 
reformist spirit of the Thaw.
79
 At the end of 1953, Grigorii Kozintsev’s production 
based on Pasternak’s translation opened in Leningrad, while a year later the erstwhile 
‘formalist’ Nikolai Okhlopkov mounted his more well-known version at Moscow’s 
Mayakovsky Theatre. Radical for its time, it featured a spectacular set dominated by a 
pair of huge metal gates designed to emphasise the theme of Denmark as prison. For 
Soviet citizens beginning to grapple with the legacies of Stalin-era terror and 
dictatorship, the contemporary resonances were all too evident. In the west, it became 
known as the ‘Iron Curtain Hamlet.’ Okhlopkov’s production was followed by a 
whole crop of Soviet Hamlets: the play was staged more often than any other 
Shakespearean tragedy in the period 1954-1962. The Hamlet fever of the Thaw 
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culminated with Grigorii Kozintsev’s internationally acclaimed film version of 
1964.
80
 
It clearly made sense for Britain to capitalise on this Hamlet fever. Violet Conolly, the 
well-informed head of the Soviet Section of the Foreign Office Research Department, 
emphasised that a British production would be warmly received thanks to ‘the lively 
and intelligent interest in Shakespeare in Russia’ stimulated by Pasternak’s 
translations of Hamlet and other Shakespeare plays.
81
 Others in the Foreign Office 
were concerned not only that a British Hamlet should be received well, but also, given 
the highly competitive nature of these cold war operations, that it should be perceived 
as superior to Soviet versions, particularly the Okhlopkov production. In the eyes of 
some British officials, this duel of the two Hamlets was to be a contest not unlike a 
football match.  
Precautions were taken to ensure that there would be no recurrence of Arsenal’s 
defeat. Once the Soviet authorities had finally agreed to the tour, the Foreign Office 
went to some lengths to guarantee that the quality of Brook’s Hamlet was beyond 
reproach. It is now generally acknowledged that although this was not one of Brook’s 
masterpieces, it had several strengths, notably its striking simplicity.
82
 The amateur 
critics of the Foreign Office shared this view: Jellicoe reported that his colleague 
Mark Russell had vetted it during its provincial run and deemed it ‘pretty good’. 
Russell thought that ‘without attempting anything spectacular’, the production was 
‘thoroughly convincing, with many clever touches.’ The costumes were ‘simple, but 
colourful’. Russell commended the generally high standard of acting, singling out 
Alec Clunes (the King), Ernest Thesiger (Polonius) and Mary Ure (Ophelia) for 
particular praise. Although, in his opinion, Scofield spoke too quickly and was weak 
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at the start, he improved as he went on, especially in his scenes with Ophelia which he 
acted ‘with a restraint, which made them most moving’. Importantly, he ‘avoided any 
temptation to try to out-Olivier Olivier.’ Jellicoe seemed satisfied that the production 
would showcase the strengths of the contemporary British approach to Shakespeare 
and offer a suitably sharp contrast to the more elaborate, melodramatic Soviet style. 
Using the typical British language of ownership, he mentioned that Russell thought it 
deserved to be shown in the USSR ‘as an example of our own school of 
Shakespearean acting and an interpretation of one of our own classics.’
83
  
The Foreign Office made several interventions designed to maximise the likelihood 
that the play would be well received and seen by the largest possible audiences. For 
example, Jellicoe asked the British Council to convey to the company the importance 
of speaking slowly. Officials were especially keen to take advantage of the 
opportunity to make Hamlet accessible to potentially millions of TV watchers. 
Television was just starting to take off in the Soviet Union in the mid-1950s and the 
Minister at the British Embassy observed that when a Comedie Francaise 
performance had been televised, people had gathered in groups in each other’s homes 
to watch it. Aware that this might create problems with the actors’ union, Equity, as it 
was not the Soviet custom to pay for TV rights, he urged that appropriate pressure be 
applied to ensure that Hamlet could be televised without hindrance.
84
 
Interpreting the Hamlet performance 
Following these extensive preparations, the company set off on their mission, arriving 
in Moscow on 21 November 1955. Between then and their departure on 3 December, 
they not only gave 13 performances of Hamlet (a veritable endurance test), but also 
‘performed’ in various other ways, including attending numerous official receptions, 
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appearing on Soviet TV and giving interviews. What was the impact of the British 
‘performance’ in its widest sense? Did it function as an effective advertisement for 
Britain in the way that officials had hoped? In his despatch to the new Foreign 
Secretary, Harold Macmillan, Hayter described the tour as ‘an unqualified success’. 
He and others in the Foreign Office were confident it had demonstrated the vitality of 
Britain and had had a ‘profound impact’ on the target audience.
85
 Naturally, their 
interpretations were coloured by engrained cold war stereotypes, however other 
evidence suggests that the tour did indeed make a big and largely positive impression, 
a fact which proved disconcerting to those Communist Party officials who were 
determined to resist any challenge to the idea of the hegemony of the Soviet system 
and its culture. It is also the case that Foreign Office officials may have 
underestimated the extent to which the tour had a ‘profound impact’ not only on 
Soviet citizens, but also on the British visitors themselves, some of whom returned 
from their trip behind the iron curtain with rather favourable impressions of the Soviet 
Union.  
 
The Soviet authorities always had ambiguous feelings about visits by western artists: 
they feared their potentially subversive effects, yet they also wanted them to succeed, 
not least because a successful visit reflected well on the hosts and made the task of 
sending their own artists to the west that much easier. They certainly went to 
considerable lengths to ensure the success of Hamlet. Even before the tour had begun, 
it received advance publicity in the Soviet press.
86
 When the cast finally arrived at 
Vnukovo airport, they received a rapturous welcome and were ‘drowned in bouquets 
and kisses’ by representatives of the theatre establishment according to Hayter, who 
made a point of highlighting how the artists’ spontaneous enthusiasm for the British 
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guests went beyond the norms of official protocol: ‘So uncontrolled were the 
demonstrations of affection that the formal part of the proceedings of welcome were 
almost swept aside and the head of the receiving delegation, the Deputy Minister of 
Culture, was practically trampled on in the stampede.’
87
  
 
The company was allocated the affiliated theatre of the prestigious Moscow Art 
Theatre, which had the advantage of being able to seat large numbers. Tickets were 
predictably in great demand, but 16,000 people managed to see the live performances 
and many more had the opportunity to watch it on television. The first night was 
attended by senior officials and theatre people including Chekhov’s widow, while a 
subsequent performance was honoured by the presence of Presidium members, 
including Molotov, Mikoian and Suslov, who hosted a small private dinner with the 
principals afterwards (Khrushchev and Bulganin were paying a visit to India, where 
they were busy lambasting British imperialism.) The tour received plenty of coverage 
in the Soviet press with the major newspapers all providing regular updates.
88
 The 
political significance of the occasion was thus made abundantly clear by the Soviet 
authorities. 
 
How was the British performance, both onstage and offstage, received? According to 
Hayter, audience responses to the production itself were largely positive. Language 
appeared not to present a significant barrier to Soviet spectators so familiar with the 
play - no simultaneous translation was offered as apparently this would have been 
‘insulting’ (‘every educated person here knows “Hamlet”’ wrote the Shakespeare 
scholar Aleksandr Anikst in the programme notes.)
89
 The ambassador heard a few 
grumbles at the first night from those who thought they had been ‘fobbed off’ with a 
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second-rate production and that Olivier would have been better in the lead role. There 
were also some criticisms of the female actors. However, the main roles attracted 
much favourable comment, with Scofield and Thesiger garnering particular praise.  
 
Most importantly, Hayter believed that the production was regarded as superior to the 
Okhlopkov version with which it was inevitably compared. This 
comparison/competition between the two Hamlets was actively encouraged by the 
Soviet hosts: Brook was flown to Baku to see the Okhlopkov production, then the 
Soviet Hamlet (Evgenii Samoilov) and Ophelia (Galina Anisimova) flew to Moscow 
and were televised performing scenes from the play alongside Ure and Scofield. 
Hayter was satisfied that Britain had ‘won’ this latest cold war competition:  
 
With Okhlopkov’s “Hamlet” fresh in their minds, the audience were in a good 
position to “look upon this picture and on this” and to contrast the simple 
realism of Mr. Brook’s production with the over-ornate and melodramatic 
romanticism of the local version. Indeed our English production of “Hamlet” 
stood out beside most of the Moscow productions like an old Dutch master 
would among the pretentious canvasses of the Tretyakov Gallery. … There 
was much else also that the Russians could learn from this production apart 
from the simplicity – the remarkably high standard of performance which 
could be attained in a few weeks by actors drawn from many different 
theatres, the striking speed which Mr. Brook was able to communicate to the 
play by making the actors deliberately speak fast during the less important 
episodes and by the remarkable swiftness of the changing of the scenes, and 
finally the natural way in which Mr. Scofield spoke the great lines, which 
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must have struck the Russian audiences as being true to the teachings of 
Stanislavsky.  
 
He concluded that Britain had ‘gained a great deal’ from the venture: ‘We pitted our 
youth against the crowds of old stagers who clutter up the boards of the Arts Theatre. 
We showed to the Russians that English actors free Shakespeare from all the 
traditional claptrap of the Moscow stage and make him real and vital.’
90
 Hayter’s 
determination to draw such a sharp distinction between the two Hamlets is striking. 
Deploying binary frameworks characteristic of cold war thinking (simple realism 
versus melodramatic romanticism, old Dutch master versus pretentious canvas, youth 
versus age), he presented the tour quite explicitly in terms of a contest, in which 
Britain had ‘gained’ a victory and the opponent was reduced to ‘learning’ from 
Britain.    
 
In the Ambassador’s view, it was not merely the production itself which seemed to 
have had a profound effect, but, equally importantly, the company’s offstage 
performance. One of the advantages of a performing arts tour as a form of cultural 
diplomacy was the opportunity it afforded for valuable ‘people-to-people’ contact.
91
 
Hayter reported that the company had created a very favourable impression by acting 
as ‘charming and patient guests’. Both Brook and Scofield had pleased their hosts by 
making speeches in Russian. All members of the cast had graciously attended 
receptions and concerts nearly every night despite their exhaustion. Hayter seemed 
particularly delighted that the British ‘team’ had outperformed the French in this 
respect, citing one Soviet theatre director’s view that the British visitors had enjoyed 
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greater success than the Comedie Francaise because as well as being great artists 
‘they are human’.
92
  
 
Hayter’s assessment of the tour reflected his confident assumptions about the 
superiority of British culture and values. However, other evidence also indicates that 
the visit made a positive, if not unequivocally favourable, impression. The play seems 
to have been appreciated by at least some members of the political elite: it was 
reported that in private even Mikoian acknowledged the merits of the British Hamlet, 
rejecting Scofield’s suggestion that Okhlopkov’s production make a return visit to 
Britain on the grounds that it would be perceived as inferior to British Shakespeare 
productions.
93
 The official seal of approval was registered more publicly in the form 
of press notices which were remarkably complimentary and full. The critics stopped 
short of suggesting that the British production was superior to their own and were at 
pains to commend those elements of the play which aligned with official Soviet 
aesthetic norms, such as its ‘realism’ and the fact that Hamlet was played as a 
fundamentally strong character in the Russian/Soviet tradition. But they also hinted at 
ways in which the USSR might learn from Britain. For example, the actor-director 
Boris Zakhava highlighted the ‘courageous’ simplicity of Brook’s Hamlet. He wrote 
that ‘the play lacks false pathos and actors’ posturing’ and remarked on the simplicity 
of Georges Wakhevitch’s set. He also alluded to the youth of Scofield and Brook 
(both in their early thirties.) The implied contrast with the much more grandiose 
Okhlopkov Hamlet and its older cast (Samoilov was 44) was surely deliberate.
94
 
Anikst commented favourably on the almost cinematic quality of the play, its restraint 
and absence of affectation, the minimalism of the set and the clever use of lighting. 
Acknowledging Brook’s reliance on formal devices, Anikst observed that these had 
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also been a feature of early Soviet theatre and suggested that it might be time for their 
own theatre to return to them.
95
 Evidently, in the reformist climate of the Thaw, it was 
considered desirable that Soviet critics and artists take some aesthetic lessons from 
their western counterparts as well as drawing on indigenous cultural legacies. 
 
Memoirs, interviews and private correspondence reinforce the impression that the 
play left a strong mark on theatre people, particularly when juxtaposed with the Soviet 
Hamlets. Senelick cites the case of a student at Moscow State University who posted 
a glowing review of the play in a lecture hall under the headline ‘This is Hamlet’, 
thereby implying that Okhlopkov’s production was deficient. Senelick also points out 
that Okhlopkov was forced to reconsider his approach in the light of the Brook 
production, replacing Samoilov with 21-year old Mikhail Kozakov.
96
 While examples 
such as these suggest that Brook’s production was the unambiguous victor in the 
battle of the Hamlets, the picture is rather more complicated. Kozakov himself 
stresses that both Hamlets were enormously influential in the mid-1950s and that not 
everyone liked Brook’s austere approach, although he does acknowledge that the 
chorus of praise for Okhlopkov’s Hamlet started to subside after Brook brought his 
production. Theatre historian Aleksei Bartoshevich recalls that as a fourteen-year old 
he found Brook’s version grey and colourless compared to Ohklopkov’s, only 
appreciating its merits later. Kozintsev, the director of the Leningrad Hamlet, was 
impressed by some, but not all, aspects of Brook’s production. He was excited by 
Scofield’s acting and the stylistic novelty of the play, but regretted that it had so little 
to say about ‘the contemporary, living relevance of this whole history.’ What is 
certain is that, in part because it was so controversial, Brook’s Hamlet exerted a 
lasting influence on Soviet theatre and culture. Anatoly Smeliansky concludes that it 
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‘stunned Moscow’s theatre world’, making ‘an indelible impression on all who were 
to decide the course of Russian theatre for decades to come.’ Bartoshevich made a 
similar point, observing how it went on to influence the style of the innovative 
Sovremennik theatre, founded in 1956. For Azary Messerer, Scofield’s performance 
was simply ‘a breakthrough in the country’s cultural history during the Cold War 
isolation … Scofield was the first Western artist who satisfied the hunger that the 
Moscow public felt for foreign art.’
97
 
 
Just as striking as the interest in the production were the displays of enthusiasm 
towards the British visito s as individuals. Westerners still had curiosity value in 
Moscow and Paul Scofield in particular was treated rather like a ‘pop star’ according 
to Brook. At a time when American popular culture was becoming more familiar in 
the USSR, he acquired the nickname ‘Johnnie Ray of Moscow’ after the young 
American singer. Members of the public seemed anxious to cultivate a distinctly 
personal relationship with the actor: some of the audience tried to storm the stage to 
get his autograph and he was ‘besieged’ by star-struck autograph-hunters on the 
street. He received warm and emotional letters from fans, sometimes accompanied by 
small gifts. One sent him a penknife and notebook, writing ‘You are a great actor. I 
have forgotten English language, but I cannot forget your Prince of Denmark by 
William Shakespeare, your voice, your eyes.’ A Moscow University student wrote to 
‘the most wonderful Hamlet’, enclosing photos of herself and her dog.
98
  It is worth 
noting that the whole notion of a celebrity culture was in many ways antithetical to 
official Soviet ideological norms which discouraged what was considered to be a 
superficial preoccupation with actors as individuals. Yet, as Kristen Roth-Ey reminds 
us, displays of ‘fandom’ were not unusual in the USSR of the 1950s, although they 
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remained largely unreported in the Soviet media.
99
 Soviet film and stage actors were 
on the receiving end of these behaviours just as much as charismatic western visitors 
like Scofield, although foreignness probably intensified the phenomenon. A few years 
later, Van Cliburn, the American winner of the first International Tchaikovsky 
Competition, would be subjected to similar outpourings of emotion.
100
  
 
Such effusive displays of ‘fandom’ directed at westerners must have been particularly 
troubling for Communist Party officials responsible for the nation’s ideological 
health. Certainly, the enthusiastic reception accorded to both the production and the 
British guests was a source of tension within the Central Committee’s Department of 
Culture. Although the Soviet government had endorsed the tour, this did not mean 
that the public was supposed to embrace it in an uncritical fashion. The discourse of 
late Stalin era ‘anti-cosmopolitanism’ resurfaced in the CC’s internal reports, with the 
euphoria around Hamlet being equated to a lack of ‘Soviet patriotism’. Press notices 
were accused of being too laudatory and insufficiently critical of the play’s 
deficiencies.
101
 It was reported that Soviet artists had engaged in ‘sycophantic and 
servile behaviour’ at receptions in honour of the guests. The singer Valeriia Barsova 
made a toast in which she praised British theatre and stated that Soviet artists had 
much to learn from it; in the CC’s eyes, this was tantamount to denigrating Soviet 
theatre. After the final show, the actor Vasilii Toporkov gave an ‘incoherent’ speech 
during which he summoned one of the British actresses to the front of the stage and 
complimented her ‘boogie-woogie’. Only after much criticism did he revert to script, 
paying tribute to the principals and presenting his book Stanislavsky in Rehearsal to 
Brook with the words ‘everything is said there.’
102
 The CC department concluded 
from all this that measures must be taken to educate artists in ‘Soviet patriotism.’ 
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Thus, it seems that whereas Hamlet did represent a welcome lifting of the iron curtain 
for many members of the Soviet public, for some Soviet officials, as for their British 
counterparts, the whole experience simply intensified cold war stereotypes and fears.  
 
But what was the significance of this encounter with the Soviet Union for the British 
visitors? Studies of the influence of western cultural initiatives in the USSR tend to be 
rather one-sided, focusing on their effects on members of the Soviet public.
 103
 Yet it 
is clear that the ‘infiltration’ process could work both ways. The Foreign Office had 
always worried that cultural relations with the USSR might lead to undesirable Soviet 
influence over Britons and when the question of a theatre visit was first discussed, 
particular concerns were expressed about the susceptibility of British actors. One 
official had disapproved of the whole project on the grounds that many of the best 
British actors were communists or fellow-travellers: ‘What would they would say in 
Moscow might be embarrassing and even more so what they might say when they 
returned…’, while at the first meeting of SRC it was observed that British actors 
visiting the USSR might be ‘too easily carried away by ‘Soviet attentions and 
propaganda.’
104
 In his despatch, Hayter doubted whether members of the company 
had been ‘taken in’ by what he called ‘the propaganda which ran through the Soviet 
hospitality’ and suggested that they were eager to leave the Soviet Union at the end of 
the tour.
105
 In fact, the attitudes of Brook, Scofield and others accompanying the tour, 
including theatre critics, were more complex. Whatever cold war assumptions they 
may have arrived with were modified by their first encounter with the Soviet Union. 
For them, the Moscow visit provided an opportunity to get to know fellow Europeans, 
to find common bonds through a shared love of drama, and to learn from Soviet 
theatre in the spirit of internationalism. Rather than the process of one-way 
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communication envisaged by the Foreign Office, they experienced the visit as a 
dialogue. 
 
For all British participants, it was an intense and exciting experience: ‘We never 
touched ground’, said Brook.
106
 For Paul Scofield, the tour marked a ‘turning point’, 
which made him question cold war stereotypes. He was overwhelmed by the warmth 
of the Russians and the sense of ‘kinship’ which developed between the two 
communities. He noticed how the audiences embraced Hamlet despite the language 
barrier: ‘They followed effortlessly every nuance of our performance, in terms of 
artistic endeavour and human compatibility they made the great ideological divide 
between Eastern and Western Europe seem unimportant. It was an experience of 
kinship. The breaking down of barriers and an awareness that we are none of us as our 
political leaders proclaim us to be.’
107
 Whereas Hayter had cast the Soviet receptions 
and speeches in terms of ‘propaganda’, Scofield was impressed by the warmth of the 
speeches, the ‘kindness and openness and generosity’ of his hosts. He clearly valued 
the letters and small gifts he received from fans, retaining them in his personal archive 
along with other souvenirs of the trip.
108
 For Scofield, this visit marked the start of 
long-lasting friendships and professional collaborations with Russians which he 
would continue to describe in terms of kinship: when he played a Russian spy in 
Michael Winner’s 1973 film Scorpio, he commented ‘the Russian agent I play is not 
like any kind of Russian I’ve ever met. The Russians I know are mostly concerned 
with the arts and I feel a tremendous sense of kinship with them.’
109
  
 
Like Scofield, Brook was struck by the warmth of his hosts and disinclined to be 
cynical, writing in his notes: ‘I am happy here, everyone is friendly, everyone talks of 
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peace. I am not going to be grudging, pick at the surface, question motives, mistrust 
appearances. There are enough political correspondents around to do that: we are their 
guests and with their Byzantine conception of doing a job grandly they have seen to it 
that they’ve won our hearts.’
110
 Brook’s experience of kinship was more literal than 
Scofield’s. His Russian-Jewish parents had emigrated from Latvia before the First 
World War, so for him the visit represented ‘a return to the land of my fathers’. While 
in Moscow he seized the opportunity to see Valentin Pluchek’s revival of 
Mayakovsky’s The Bedbug, one of the most exciting Soviet productions of the mid-
1950s. Hugely impressed, Brook had the strange sense while watching it: ‘Now, that’s 
exactly how I would have done that scene.’ He subsequently discovered that Pluchek 
was actually his cousin, the son of his father’s sister. After this first encounter, the 
cousins continued to stay in contact and follow each other’s work.
111
  
 
The Bedbug was just one of many plays Brook saw while in Moscow: over the course 
of the visit, he managed to take in at least one show every day.
112
 With his long-
standing interest in European and world theatre, he relished the opportunity to 
familiarise himself with the culture of the country that had produced Chekhov, 
Stanislavsky and Meyerhold. Although not uncritical of current Soviet productions, 
Brook acknowledged the merits of the USSR’s theatre art and displayed an interest in 
learning from it.
113
 Confessing to one interviewer that he had come to Moscow armed 
with stereotypes about the uniformity of Soviet culture, he admitted he had been 
pleasantly surprised to learn that each theatre had its own style, singling out the 
Moscow Art Theatre and Pluchek’s Theatre of Satire for particular praise.
114
 Brook 
was clearly impressed by the high regard in which Shakespeare was held in the USSR 
(less possessive than Foreign Office officials, he declared that ‘Shakespeare is ours 
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and yours.’)
115
 Even though the style of Soviet Shakespeare was not to his taste - ‘it is 
all Paris-Opera 1850’ - he was prepared to recognise its strengths. While critical of 
Okhlopkov’s interpretation of Hamlet, he admired its ‘masterly’ execution and envied 
the staging, which was far more elaborate than anything he could afford. He also 
praised its ‘realism’ and the quality of the acting.
116
 More generally, Brook was struck 
by the consistently high standard of acting and directing in Moscow, which he 
attributed not only to the Russian theatrical tradition but also to the Soviet system of 
permanent ensembles. In his view, this was vastly superior to Britain’s commercial 
system of temporary companies, since it allowed a group of actors to get to know each 
other over a long period, offered them a chance to experiment with a range of roles 
rather than being typecast, and gave them the confidence which comes with job 
security.
117
  
 
Others were similarly impressed by aspects of the Soviet order. Scofield was equally 
enthusiastic about the permanent ensembles, observing subsequently that these 
encouraged a standard of acting that ‘English and American companies could not 
begin to emulate.’
118
 The critic Kenneth Tynan found plenty to compliment, including 
the quality of the older generation of actors ‘the finest I have ever seen’, the system of 
permanent companies, and the choice of plays on offer.  He concluded ‘My ideal 
would be to have a Western theatre organised on Russian lines but without Russian 
ideology. But I fear that without the driving force of an ideology, such a theatre could 
never be created.’
119
 For Tynan, and for the other visitors, this journey behind the iron 
curtain thus represented a unique opportunity for critical reflection on the nature of 
both the Soviet Union and the west.   
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So, it seems that the Hamlet tour had a ‘profound impact’ not only on the Soviet 
public, but also on several of the British visitors, including some of the most 
influential names in British theatre. Their first-hand encounter with the USSR left 
them rather sceptical about the rigidities of cold war thinking and led them to the 
conclusion that the Soviet Union might have something to offer the west. They 
particularly admired the Soviet state’s support for theatre and their positive 
experiences doubtless contributed to the growing pressure for increased state funding 
for British theatre. By the end of the 1950s, this pressure was already beginning to 
produce concrete results, as Britain, like many other western states, felt compelled to 
keep up in the ‘cultural arms race’ which was one of the more productive 
consequences of the cold war.
120
  
 
Conclusion 
 
As the first big British cultural manifestation to be held in the Soviet Union under 
SRC auspices, Hamlet was a relatively costly and risky experiment.
121
 The Foreign 
Office regarded it as ‘a resounding success.’ Jellicoe concluded that the visit proved 
that ‘we stand to gain by letting the Russians see something of British culture. The 
impact on the Soviet intelligentsia, who in the long-term are our main target in the 
Soviet Union, can be very considerable.’ The success of Hamlet provided a strong 
justification for the expansion of Soviet-British cultural relations and for further 
British theatre tours of the Soviet Union.
122
 With the exception of a hiatus following 
the Soviet intervention in Hungary, government-sponsored cultural relations with the 
USSR continued to grow at the expense of the ‘fronts’; in the decade after 1955 alone, 
the Shakespeare Memorial Theatre/Royal Shakespeare Company, the Old Vic and the 
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National Theatre all brought productions of Shakespeare to the USSR, while the 
Moscow Arts Theatre paid two reciprocal visits to London under SRC/British Council 
auspices. British musicians and dancers toured the USSR too, of course, but theatre 
remained a higher priority for many in the Foreign Office throughout the cold war, 
not only because of the strong reputation of British theatre, but also because it came to 
be seen by some as a more powerful means of conveying ideas.
123
 
 
At a pivotal moment in the mid-1950s, Britain played a leading role in western 
governments’ turn to cultural diplomacy as a mode of dealing with the USSR. This is 
another example of how Europeans, with their distinct agendas and approaches, 
helped to shape the pattern of east-west relations.  It is clear that the more 
2321`hesitant US was keenly observing the British experience and that the success of 
Hamlet helped to convince the Eisenhower administration of the political advantages 
of ‘cultural infiltration’. By the late 1950s, the US government was itself actively 
involved in performing arts exchanges with the USSR. British and American 
approaches were never homogeneous, however: whereas Britain tended to prioritise 
theatre, the US preferred to deploy its classical and jazz musicians and dancers. The 
first state-sponsored American theatre tour of the Soviet Union only took place in 
1973.  
  
When assessing the significance of east-west cultural diplomacy, it is important to 
explore what initiatives such as Hamlet meant to protagonists on both sides and at 
various levels of the process. While British officials regarded the Hamlet ‘operation’ 
as an opportunity to exert influence on the Soviet Union, rather than vice versa, their 
Soviet counterparts seem to have been somewhat more open to learning from British 
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theatre. In the reformist and optimistic climate of the Thaw, it was considered 
legitimate for the USSR to draw selectively on western achievements. However, there 
was always a fine line between learning from western culture and extolling it at the 
expense of Soviet culture: the latter continued to be construed as anti-patriotic by 
some officials. From the perspective of the Soviet leadership, learning from Britain 
was always a subsidiary aim; the fundamental purpose of the venture was to make 
political gains by facilitating the export of Soviet culture, exposing influential British 
visitors to the strengths of Soviet culture, validating the regime’s preference for realist 
art and demonstrating that the USSR enjoyed legitimacy in the eyes of a major 
western power. 
 
If Soviet and British officials tended to view Hamlet in narrow political terms, as a 
means of advancing their respective cold war objectives, it was understood in a rather 
different, more internationalist vein by others involved, including Soviet and British 
artists and members of the Soviet public. For them, Brook’s interpretation of this 
Shakespearean classic and the events surrounding the tour provided an opportunity for 
genuine ‘mutual understanding’, for getting to know Europeans on the other side of 
the iron curtain and for exploring common cultural interests. In this way, it forced 
many to confront the stereotypes they held not only about the other side, but also 
about their own society.
124
 For all its limitations as a form of influence, the Hamlet 
tour was responsible for transforming perceptions in both halves of cold war Europe. 
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